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1 
 Abstract 
 
David Cooper has argued that it is a constraint on any acceptable theory of metaphor 
that it account for the  'indeterminacy' of metaphorical content, that is, the sense that 
many metaphors admit of more than one acceptable interpretation, none of which can 
be uniquely demonstrated to be correct.  He further argues that the 'speaker's 
meaning' model of metaphorical content proposed by Searle and others cannot meet 
this constraint, and thus must be disregarded as a prospective account of such 
content. 
 
In this paper I argue firstly that Cooper's characterisation of the proposed constraint 
is misguided, and that we should be careful to distinguish the role that intention plays 
in determining metaphorical content from the question of whether we can have 
satisfying interpretations of metaphors that do not take speaker intention into 
account.  I then give my own characterisation of the problem, relating it to a more 
general tension between the intuition that first person ascriptions of intentions carry a 
certain authority, and the fact that it seems to misrepresent the phenomenology of 
metaphor production to ascribe to the speaker a pre-existing and precise cognitive 
content which his metaphorical utterance is intended to convey.  I go on to argue that 
we can resolve this tension by following Crispin Wright in viewing self ascriptions of 
intention as essentially response dependent; with our best judgements constituting 
rather than tracking the facts about what we intend.  I conclude that while such an 
account must be refined in order to distinguish intentions related to specifically 
metaphorical content from the literal case, the general shape of the account is 
sufficient to remove the intuitions that Cooper's objection trades on. 
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Introduction 
 
Intention plainly has something to do with metaphor.  We can choose to make a metaphor, 
and intend our utterance to be taken as such.  We have a certain authority with respect to our 
utterances; we are entitled in many circumstances, to treat lack of respect for a prior intention 
as a cognitive failing.  You've misunderstood me, we might say, I wasn't speaking literally, or 
I didn't intend that aspect of the metaphor to be emphasised.  Admittedly, this need not be, 
and in all probability isn't always the case.  When speaking to a psychoanalyst, or writing a 
novel, for example, one might implicitly or explicitly renounce a certain degree of authority 
over the interpretation of one's metaphors, along with some of one's literal utterances.  
Moreover, there might be many other types of cases where speakers happily allow their 
metaphorical utterance to be extended in a way that is new or surprising to them.  We should 
not let consideration of these cases blur an important distinction, however.  To take a 
somewhat analogous case, there is a big difference between being happy with a way a witty 
remark is picked up and elaborated upon, and claiming the embellishments as one's own.  We 
need an account of the role of intention that allows us to make just this kind of distinction in 
the case of metaphorical utterance. 
 
On the other hand, there might seem to be a problem in reconciling this consideration with the 
peculiarly open-ended quality of metaphor.  Many commentators, for example, have felt 
dissatisfied with a straightforward "speaker's meaning" account of metaphor, which in its 
crudest form holds that: 
 
I: S's metaphorical utterance m means that p iff S intends m to convey that p.1 
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 Such an account is clearly so over-simplistic as to allow straightforward disqualification  as a 
serious theory of metaphorical meaning; the spiralling complexities of speech act theory have 
taught us that.  Yet we might be sceptical of the prospects for any such account, however 
hedged and qualified, and not only for this crude precursor.  Surely, we might want to say, 
this whole approach to metaphor is in danger of just misrepresenting the phenomenology of 
metaphorical utterance.  We don't typically have a distinct content ‘in mind’, as it were, that 
we then express via the use of metaphor.  Indeed, if we did, it would seem to render the 
motivation behind metaphorical utterance a little mysterious.  If you intend to say that p, then 
why not just say it?  We seem to be close to a view of metaphor that characterises it merely as 
amusing embellishment, or useful shorthand.  And such a view has often been felt to be 
philosophically and phenomenologically unsatisfying.  Of course, one response to this worry 
would be to deny that we have any privileged access to the content of our own intentions, to 
hold that we can have at best inductive evidence, resulting from a process of self-
interpretation, for what we intend and mean, even in the most everyday cases.  But this move, 
in turn, makes a mystery of the very authority we grant to speakers, which originally 
supported the speaker-intention model.  We need an theory of metaphor that allows us to be 
faithful to the phenomenology of metaphor making, while also delivering a satisfying account 
of how we interact with metaphor makers.  It may seem, however, that no speaker-meaning 
theory can deliver both desiderata. 
 
Cooper's objections 
 
David Cooper has objected to the speaker's meaning view of metaphor along related, if not 
strictly analogous, lines.2 His objection contends that such a view cannot account for the 
indeterminacy of metaphorical content.  A metaphor is indeterminate in Cooper's sense if it 
admits of more than one interpretation, none of which can be demonstrated as uniquely 
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 correct.  Cooper holds that any successful account of metaphor must give us a story about 
metaphorical indeterminacy. 
 
It is clear that Cooper's characterisation is unsatisfactory as it stands - it lets in cases where all 
interpretations are clearly incorrect, for example.3 Rather than try to offer an improved 
version, however, I intend to take it merely as gesturing at some important aspects of our 
normal thought about metaphor: namely, that metaphor is apt for competing, independently 
satisfying interpretations of which there is seemingly no a priori guarantee, in the general 
case, that we will have reason to adopt one rather than another. 
 
Cooper considers three possible ways in which the speaker-intention model could try to 
account for such indeterminacy.  Firstly, the indeterminacy might be caused by our ignorance 
of what exactly it is that the speaker intended.  Secondly, the speaker’s intention might be 
somehow ‘open-ended’ or indeterminate.  Cooper characterises this option, following Searle, 
as implying that when S utters some metaphor of the form ‘A is B’, he intends to mean or 
implicate a range of meanings; A is C1 and/or A is C2, C3 etc.  Finally, we might take the 
indeterminacy to be a feature related to the fact that different possible speakers could use the 
same sentence to convey different contents.  Cooper rejects all three of these proposed 
accounts. 
 
Cooper's arguments 
 
In this part of this paper, I want to look more closely at what exactly Cooper thinks is wrong 
with the various accounts.  I will argue that his discussion is unsatisfactory in a number of 
respects, and then go on to claim that the idea that in metaphorical utterance the speaker’s 
intention is ‘open-ended’ can be better characterised and defended. 
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 Cooper has a number of objections to the first proposal:  
 
(M1) A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff we are ignorant of what an actual speaker 
S intended to convey by his corresponding metaphorical utterance P. 
 
He first considers the case were we have no knowledge of S at all, and concludes that this 
case collapses into a special case of the third proposal (M3, see below); with the 
indeterminacy being caused by the speculation about what different possible speakers might 
have meant.  He then argues that even if we do know quite a lot about the identity and context 
of S, a limited amount of ignorance about his environment can still leave us completely in the 
dark about S's intention.  He cites solely literary cases 
 
In learning about writers such as Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Marinetti and Ezra Pound, one soon 
learns that speculation as to what they intended to communicate by individual metaphors is 
pointless - in the dual sense of being a waste of time and beside the point.  But this does not 
mean that it is pointless to try and interpret the metaphors, nor that any old interpretation will 
do.4 
 
Having argued that the interpretation of metaphor can be relatively determinate even when we 
know little about the speaker's intentions, Cooper goes on to argue the converse; that we can 
be sure of what the speaker's intentions were without determining the metaphorical content.   
 
The speaker, poet or painter does not have exclusive rights to interpretation - and even if he 
did his interpretation would not have to mimic his intention at the time of composition.5 
 
So, he concludes, ignorance of an actual speaker's intention is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for a metaphor to have an indeterminate content. 
6 
  
If the point here is solely that we can come up with satisfying interpretations of apparently 
metaphorical utterances that mention little about the actual speaker, then the point is well 
taken. But that is surely not what should be at issue here.  We should be careful not to confuse 
the idea that we can interpret what a person knowingly said in making an utterance with the 
idea that we can interpret the sentence he uttered in a way that satisfies us in some respect.  
The whole idea of something being an unintentional double entendre, for example, relies on 
there being a gap between what a speaker actually said and the possibility of construing it in a 
satisfying way.  We should similarly admit the existence of non-intentional metaphors – in the 
sense of sentences or utterances that we can intelligibly or usefully treat as if they were 
metaphors – which we can generate and interpret for particular purposes.  Perhaps Burroughs' 
technique of cutting up newspapers and randomly assorting often suggestive sentences would 
be a clear example of how we can intentionally bring about such non-intentional metaphors.  
Nobody should claim that only intentional utterances can be interpreted as if they were 
metaphors, just as nobody should suggest that only intentional jokes – or joke shaped 
utterances -  are funny.  But this should not lead us to play down the role of intention in the 
practice of joke telling, nor in metaphor. 
 
In addition, we must be careful not to assume that we can give a unified account of how we 
should best interpret metaphors, no matter in what context they may arise.  The cases Cooper 
cites, involving Modernist writers, may well demand a different treatment than the everyday 
case, but this is not to say that we haven't identified an important feature of the everyday case 
when we link metaphor to an intended use of a sentence. 
 
Let us assume, in the interests of charity, that Cooper's target is only the 'naïve' intention 
theorist, who thinks that M1 says all that needs to be said about metaphoric indeterminacy.  
His arguments against naïve intentionalism then seem cogent; metaphoric determinacy and 
actual speaker intention can come apart.  What about the second idea then, namely; 
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(M2) A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff the speaker's intention is open ended. 
 
Cooper admits that a speaker can, on occasion, intend for a metaphor to be taken in 'several 
ways at the same time'.6 Perhaps when I say "John is a real giant among men", I can intend 
that his mother will think that I am praising him, while knowing that you will really know that 
I am drawing attention to his weight problem.  But, Cooper argues, this is not happily 
characterised as intending to mean C1 or C2 by P, but rather C1 and C2.  Moreover, it cannot 
suffice for a metaphor to be indeterminate that the relevant intended meaning be vague, since 
that would suggest not incommensurate interpretations but a single one that 'matches the 
speaker's intention in vagueness'7  Nor can S intend merely to try out a striking sounding 
sentence, for that would render the relevant speaker's meaning non-existent, not open-ended. 
 
Cooper claims that there is only one kind of case that 
 
might happily be described as one of 'speaker's open ended meaning'.  This is where the 
proposition meant by the speaker is of the open-ended form 'P or Q or …'.  [But] To say that a 
speaker might have meant P, or might have meant Q, is not equivalent to saying that he meant 
a disjunctive proposition P or Q or…8 
 
Cooper rightly points out that whereas we might be happy to say of a notoriously ironic friend 
that we often don't know whether he is saying P or saying not-P, we never take him to be 
uttering the tautology P or not-P. 
 
All these arguments, I would suggest, are fine as far as they go.  But Cooper is wrong, I think, 
to take the best construal of M2 as involving vagueness or disjunction.  In the latter half of 
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 this essay, I want to outline what I take to be a better picture of how intention and 
indeterminacy are related. 
 
We can deal briefly with  
 
(M3) A metaphorical content M is indeterminate iff different possible speakers could mean 
different things by the corresponding utterance P. 
 
This is untenable, and Cooper rightly demolishes it.  Firstly, there are just too many possible 
speakers.  We have to narrow them down to the 'most reasonable ones', and Cooper argues, 
we can do so precisely because we have a prior idea of what counts as a reasonable 
interpretation of the metaphor.  Our grasp of the metaphoric content determines the relevant 
possible speakers, and not vice versa.  I am slightly sceptical about the general effectiveness 
of this response to more plausible modifications of (M3), but do not intend to take issue with 
it here. 
 
A more general problem? 
 
Let's go back to the problem that we started out with.  There is a tension between two ways 
we might want to think about metaphor.  On the one hand, we are pulled in the direction of 
saying that the speaker’s intention must in some sense constrain acceptable interpretation of 
metaphor.  After all, how else are we to explain the common sense idea that the speaker has 
often selected a particular metaphor, that she has reasons for using the expression that she 
does, etc?  On the other hand, there is definite substance to the intuition that lies behind 
Cooper's objection.  The idea that in metaphorical utterance we have a definite and pre-
existing content to convey, that the problem of selecting a metaphor is one of how best to 
dress up such a content in borrowed clothes, seems to completely misrepresent the 
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 phenomenology of what we do.  Typically metaphors spring to mind with a rather vague 
feeling of aptness.  We can often struggle to express or even elucidate in literal language what 
we meant by a metaphor.  Yet typically we can recognise interpretations of a metaphor as 
being in or out of accord with the way we meant them to be understood.  We ought not to 
envisage ourselves as throwing metaphors out into the world, semi-randomly as it were, to 
fare as they happen to be taken up and elaborated on, whether by ourselves or others.  But 
similarly it seems difficult to see how, after the metaphor has been correctly and fully 
interpreted, taken in the way we meant it, we could have had a prior intention to mean or 
implicate all of that. 
 
I think we should see this tension as an instance of a more general issue about intentional 
states, discussed by Crispin Wright in a number of papers9 and usefully summarised by Jim 
Edwards: 
 
The problem is to reconcile the first person epistemology of such intentional states, the fact 
that we normally take a person’s sincere avowals of his own intentional states to be 
authoritative, with the fact that an intentional state may also ‘have to answer to’ future 
behaviour, behaviour which the subject need not ‘have had in mind’ when he made the 
avowal.10 
 
 
In the case of metaphor, the intentional state in question is what the speaker intended to mean 
by the metaphor.  The future behaviour is the responses and judgements made by the speaker 
concerning which interpretations and extensions of the metaphor are in accord with his 
original intention.  Wright’s attempted resolution of the problem involves taking the speaker’s 
considered belief about what he intended to mean to constitute the facts about what he meant, 
rather than seeing them as tracking an independent fact of the matter.  What I intend by a 
metaphor can be open-ended precisely because for any given interpretation, extension or 
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 development of the metaphor, there is not an independently determined, pre-existing fact 
about whether it accords with my intention. 
 
Wright’s Provisional Equations 
 
Before we go on to consider the particular case of metaphor, let’s look a little more closely at 
how Wright’s general account is structured.  He is interested in different ways of interpreting 
what he calls ‘Provisional Equations’, which take the following general form 
 
(PE) For a set of optimal conditions C, a state of affairs P, and a subject S:  
  
If C holds, then (it would be the case that P iff S would judge that P). 
 
There are two different ways, Wright thinks, that we could understand the case where PE 
holds true for a particular C, P and S.  We could understand the C-conditions as being such as 
to allow S to successfully track an independently obtaining fact that P.  That is, we could 
understand the biconditional as indicating that S judges that P because P is the case.  For 
example, we might understand the PE that told us that under relevant C-conditions S judged 
that x was square when and only when it was square as holding because x was in fact square, 
and, under conditions C, S is a competent judge of squareness.  Call this the extension-
reflecting sense. 
 
On the other hand, we could understand the biconditional as indicating that it is S’s best 
opinion that constitutes the fact that P.  In this case, we understand it as telling us that P is the 
case because S judges that P.  For example, we might take the PE that told us that under 
relevant C-conditions S judged that x was funny when and only when it was funny as holding 
11 
 because the facts about funniness depend on our best judgements about what’s funny.  Call 
this the extension-determining sense.11 
 
How are we to tell which way we should read the Provisional Equation?  Wright’s idea is that 
it should be read as extension determining just in case it meets a set of further constraints.  
First, the C-conditions must be specified substantially, not by means of a ‘whatever it takes’ 
ceteris paribus clause.  Second, they must be a priori true.  Third, whether the C-conditions 
are satisfied must be logically independent of facts about P.  And finally, our case for reading 
it as extension determining must be extremal; there must be no better explanation of why the 
first three conditions are satisfied than the claim that S’s best judgements constitute the fact 
that P. 
 
What is the motivation behind these constraints?  Wright wants to test whether or not a 
particular biconditional is extension determining or extension reflecting by examining 
whether or not there is a merely accidental link between our best judgements and whether or 
not the fact that P holds.  It is clear that if we specify the C-conditions by means of a 
‘whatever it takes’ clause, the biconditional will hold trivially true, and thus prevent us from 
examining whether the link between judgement and fact holds merely contingently.12 So we 
must specify the C-conditions in more detail, without appeal to ceteris paribus clauses.  If we 
do so, and the biconditional holds a priori true, then that will be a sign that the facts of the 
matter cannot come apart from our best judgements of the matter, and thus that we should 
construe the Equation in the extension-determining sense.  But such a sign will only be an 
accurate guide if the further two conditions hold. 
 
The independence condition is required in order that we can allow echoing, making use of the 
very concepts that we are concerned with in specifying the optimality conditions, without 
running the risk that we might be jeopardising the idea that the a prioriticity of the PE can be 
a test of whether the relevant concepts are extension reflecting or determining.  By making 
12 
 sure that the concepts only occur, if at all, in contexts governed by intensional operators, we 
ensure that there is no 'hidden reference' to the extension built into the optimality conditions.  
We avoid the charge that in specifying the conditions under which, for example, we can best 
judge whether something is red, we have implicitly appealed to an response-independent 
property of redness, thereby rendering our proposed test valueless. 
 
The extremal condition, that there must be no better explanation of why the first three 
conditions are satisfied than that S's best opinions constitute the fact that P, is intended to 
leave room for the idea that the a priori co-extensiveness of judgement and fact might be a 
result of our infallibility about a particular type of fact, for example, and not an indication that 
our judgements constitute the relevant facts.  In effect, the condition ensures that if we are to 
be justified in claiming such infallibility we must be able to give a pretty detailed story of 
why and how we can be infallible about this particular type of fact.  In the absence of such a 
story, we are entitled to assume that our best judgements determine what the facts are. 
 
Provisional Equations and Intentions 
 
How might such an account look with respect to first person self-ascriptions of intention?  
Consider the Provisional Equation for Intention (PEI), and its past tense counterpart (PEI*) 
for any subject S and content P 
 
(PEI)  If conditions C hold13 then (S believes that S intends P iff S intends P). 
(PEI*) If conditions C hold then (S believes that S intended P iff S intended P). 
 
Wright argues that in suitable conditions a subject's judgements about his own intentions 
constitute the fact that he has such and such intention.  It is not at best a contingent matter 
whether or not we have access to our own intentions, he thinks.  Rather, it is precisely the fact 
13 
 that our best opinion determines whether or not we have a particular intention that explains 
why we are ‘effortlessly, non-inferentially and generally reliable about [our own] 
psychological states.’14  
 
Of course, it is possible for us to be self-deceived about our own states of mind.  Moreover, 
there seems to be no straightforward way of ruling out such self-deception in formulating the 
C-conditions in PEI and PEI*, without running into trouble with the substantiality condition.  
Nevertheless, Wright holds, the 'grammar' of intention is such that we are a priori entitled to 
presume that we are not deceived, unless we have actual evidence to the contrary.  That is, 
although we cannot include a 'no self-deception' clause in the optimality conditions and still 
fulfil the substantiality condition, we can still be a priori justified in holding that any given 
instances of PEI and PEI* are true.  (That is, we are not a priori justified in holding that the 
universal closures are true, but we are in holding that any given instances are.) 
 
Such justification is a priori but defeasible, since evidence that S was in fact self-deceived 
would remove it.  Wright’s claim, therefore, is that the fact that PEI and PEI* are a priori 
justified is, in the absence of a better explanation, enough to show that our best opinions 
about our own intentions are extension-determining rather than extension reflecting. 15 
 
Since it is our best judgements about what we intend or intended that constitute the facts 
about our intentions, we can reconcile the idea that we have a definite authority with respect 
to our own intentions with the fact that intentions have to 'answer to' future demands about 
behaviour which we may not have considered at the time when we first formulated the 
intention.  Self-deception aside, our judgements are not tracking independent facts about what 
we intend - so that, even in best conditions,  I could fail to be true to my original intention to, 
say, mean plus by 'plus'.  Rather, the facts about what we intend depend on the possibility of 
our judging that they are thus and so. 
 
14 
 A Reply to Cooper's objection 
 
We now have the resources to make the case that in making a metaphor, the speaker's 
intention concerning how it should be understood can be essentially 'open-ended'.  The correct 
reply is that intentions concerning metaphorical content are merely a special case of intending 
in general.  In the correct conditions, my judgements about my own intentions are, as Wright 
has plausibly argued, constitutively linked to the facts about what those intentions are.  So 
there is no need for the intention theorist to have to make the case that in intending to 
authoritatively convey a propositional content P by uttering a metaphor M, a speaker S must 
somehow have had P 'before his mind' when intending to utter M metaphorically.  It is a 
perfectly acceptable picture to conceive our access to the facts about what S intended by a 
particular metaphor as primarily relating to when, under optimal conditions, he would judge 
that a particular interpretation is in accord with what he intended. 
 
Cooper originally defined a metaphor as being indeterminate just in case it admitted of more 
than one interpretation, none of which can be demonstrated as uniquely correct.  We have 
seen that we must distinguish the idea that there can be satisfying and productive 
interpretations of 'non-intentional metaphors' from the notion that a speaker's utterance has a 
metaphorical content that admits of more than one interpretation.  So Cooper requires a 
narrower definition of what indeterminacy consists in.  What I want to argue is that the 
intuition that metaphors are in some sense indeterminate because a speaker simply couldn't 
have had all that content in his mind's eye, as it were, is simply misplaced.  The speaker 
typically does not have a independently determined content in mental view, which he then 
conveys with a greater or lesser degree of success.  Nor is he merely in equal hermeneutic 
standing with his interlocutor, forced to interpret his own metaphors in just the same fashion 
as he interprets those of others, and as others interpret him.  Rather, the speaker can inhabit an 
epistemically optimal position from which to arbitrate between different interpretations, 
15 
 making constitutive judgements as to which was in accord with his earlier intention.  But this 
doesn't entail that indeterminacy in Cooper's sense is completely removed, that one can 
uniquely demonstrate that one interpretation is correct.  Such a demonstration is not possible 
since the interpretation at hand is always defeasible, conditional not only on the possession of 
a continuing warrant to hold that the relevant epistemic conditions are ideal, but also on the 
speaker's future judgements and avowals relating to alternative or modified interpretations.16 
 
Of course, all this still leaves plenty of room for a speaker to be mistaken about what he 
intended.  If optimal conditions do not hold, or there is evidence that he is self-deceived, then 
PEI is silent about whether or not S's judgements constitute the facts about what he means.  
We might favour a subjunctive account, appealing to what the speaker would have meant.  
Alternatively, in many cases where the optimal conditions for PEI do not hold, the optimal 
conditions for radical interpretation still might, and we might take the facts to be constituted 
by the judgements of a actual or hypothetical radical interpreter.  In other cases, including 
perhaps the case of the Modernist novelist and the psycho-analytic patient, I might be taken to 
have renounced my first person authoritative standpoint with respect to my intentions, even 
when I actually inhabit best conditions.17 But there will be a wide area of cases in which it is 
precisely my best judgements that are authoritative.18 
 
We have the beginnings of a solution, then, to the problem we started off with.  In the 
everyday case, there is a firm link between speaker intention and metaphor.  But we needn't 
imagine that this entails having the whole metaphorical content antecedently 'in mind' in the 
philosophically problematic way.  This was the very picture that Cooper's suggestion that 
metaphorical content is indeterminate was reacting against. Instead, it is open to us to replace 
this picture with another which allows the nature of our knowledge of intention itself to be 
characteristically 'open'.  Wright's theory has just this feature, since the existence of facts 
about what I intended are conditional on my best judgements, many of which, at any given 
time, I shall not have considered or made. 
16 
  
Cooper thus needs a finer grained definition of metaphoric indeterminacy, one that avoids the 
danger of triviality posed by the general open-endedness of first person ascriptions of 
intentions.  Until such a definition is offered, we can take it that his 'indeterminacy' objection 
simply lapses. 
 
Much more than this has to be said, of course, in order to differentiate this type of 
metaphorical indeterminacy from the general indeterminacy highlighted by Wright's account 
of intention.  After all, that account applies as much to '2+2=4' as to 'Juliet is the sun'.  
Perhaps metaphor is a case in which there is a stricter set of optimality conditions.  Perhaps in 
some cases we are happier to admit that, at the time of utterance, we didn't quite know exactly 
what we meant to convey, while in the literal case we resist this much more strongly.  
Moreover, there will no doubt be many cases where the particular propositional content 
intended to be conveyed by the speaker is just not to the point: we like the metaphor because 
of its non-propositional effects on us, say the way the words sound together.  The main point 
remains a good one, however.  Cooper's objection is motivated by the right intuition, but he 
misconstrues the nature of the solution required. 
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demonstrate'.  I do not address here the interesting question of whether we can get ourselves 
into a position of having a warrant to ascribe a metaphorical content that in fact survives 
arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrary extensions of the state of information 
that warrants it.  It may well be the case that ascriptions of metaphorical content can be 
superassertible in this sense.  (See Wright’s Truth and Objectivity). 
 
17 We might characterise what is happening here in different ways.   Is it a refusal to make the 
judgement about my intentions, even if ideal conditions hold?  Or a second order intention 
that my first order intention not be taken as authoritative?  (I might of course still require that 
my second order intention be taken as such.) 
 
18 Or if not, the case has to be made.  I take it that e.g. postmodernist critics aim to show that 
the optimality conditions are never fulfilled - the lures of patriarchy, ideology or the 
unconscious mean I am always self-deceived.  I leave open the question of whether this is a 
coherent thought. 
 
19 Thanks to Gary Kemp, Jim Edwards, Bob Hale, Pat Shaw, Roger White, Crispin Wright 
and the Editor for helpful remarks and criticisms. 
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